Treatises on Friendship and Old Age
by Marcus Tullius Cicero
De Amicitia Sections
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7. And great and numerous as are the blessings of friendship, this
certainly is the sovereign one, that it gives us bright hopes for the
future and forbids weakness and despair. In the face of a true
friend a man sees as it were a second self. So that where his friend
is he is; if his friend be rich, he is not poor; though he be weak, his
friend's strength is his; and in his friend's life he enjoys a second
life after his own is finished. This last is perhaps the most difficult
to conceive. But such is the effect of the respect, the loving
remembrance, and the regret of friends which follow us to the
grave. While they take the sting out of death, they add a glory to
the life of the survivors. Nay, if you eliminate from nature the tie
of affection, there will be an end of house and city, nor will so
much as the cultivation of the soil be left. If you don't see the
virtue of friendship and harmony, you may learn it by observing
the effects of quarrels and feuds. Was any family ever so well
established, any State so firmly settled, as to be beyond the reach
of utter destruction from animosities and factions? This may teach
you the immense advantage of friendship.
They say that a certain philosopher of Agrigentum, in a Greek
poem, pronounced with the authority of an oracle the doctrine that
whatever in nature and the universe was unchangeable was so in
virtue of the binding force of friendship; whatever was changeable
was so by the solvent power of discord. And indeed this is a truth
which everybody understands and practically attests by experience.
For if any marked instance of loyal friendship in confronting or
sharing danger comes to light, every one applauds it to the echo.
What cheers there were, for instance, all over the theatre at a
passage in the new play of my friend and guest Pacuvius; where
the king, not knowing which of the two was Orestes, Pylades
declared himself to be Orestes, that he might die in his stead, while
the real Orestes kept on asserting that it was he. The audience rose
_en masse_ and clapped their hands. And this was at an incident in
fiction: what would they have done, must we suppose, if it had
been in real life? You can easily see what a natural feeling it is,
when men who would not have had the resolution to act thus
themselves, shewed how right they thought it in another.
I don't think I have any more to say about friendship. If there is any
more, and I have no doubt there is much, you must, if you care to
do so, consult those who profess to discuss such matters.
_Fannius_. We would rather apply to you. Yet I have often
consulted such persons, and have heard what they had to say with a
certain satisfaction. But in your discourse one somehow feels that
there is a different strain.
_Scaevola_. You would have said that still more, Fannius, if you
had been present the other day in Scipio's pleasure-grounds when
we had the discussion about the State. How splendidly he stood up
for justice against Philus's elaborate speech.
_Fannius_. Ah! it was naturally easy for the justest of men to
stand up for justice.
_Scaevola_. Well, then, what about friendship? Who could
discourse on it more easily than the man whose chief glory is a
friendship maintained with the most absolute fidelity, constancy,
and integrity?
8. _Laelius_. Now you are really using force. It makes no
difference what kind of force you use: force it is. For it is neither
easy nor right to refuse a wish of my sons-in-law, particularly
when
the wish is a creditable one in itself.
Well, then, it has very often occurred to me when thinking about
friendship, that the chief point to be considered was this: is it
weakness and want of means that make friendship desired? I
mean, is its object an interchange of good offices, so that each may
give that in which he is strong, and receive that in which he is
weak? Or is it not rather true that, although this is an advantage
naturally belonging to friendship, yet its original cause is quite
other, prior in time, more noble in character, and springing more
directly from our nature itself? The Latin word for friendship-
_amicitia_-is derived from that for love-_amor_; and love is
certainly the prime mover in contracting mutual affection.
For as to material advantages, it often happens that those are
obtained even by men who are courted by a mere show of
friendship and treated with respect from interested motives. But
friendship by its nature admits of no feigning, no pretence: as far
as it goes it is both genuine and spontaneous. Therefore I gather
that friendship springs from a natural impulse rather than a wish
for help: from an inclination of the heart, combined with a certain
instinctive feeling of love, rather than from a deliberate calculation
of the material advantage it was likely to confer. The strength of
this feeling you may notice in certain animals. They show such
love to their offspring for a certain period, and are so beloved by
them, that they clearly have a share in this natural, instinctive
affection. But of course it is more evident in the case of man: first,
in the natural affection between children and their parents, an
affection which only shocking wickedness can sunder; and next,
when the passion of love has attained to a like strength-on our
finding, that is, some one person with whose character and nature
we are in full sympathy, because we think that we perceive in him
what I may call the beacon-light of virtue. For nothing inspires
love, nothing conciliates affection, like virtue. Why, in a certain
sense we may be said to feel affection even for men we have never
seen, owing to their honesty and virtue. Who, for instance, fails to
dwell on the memory of Gaius Fabricius and Manius Curius with
some affection and warmth of feeling, though he has never seen
them? Or who but loathes Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius,
Spurius Maelius? We have fought for empire in Italy with two
great generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal. For the former, owing to his
probity, we entertain no great feelings of enmity: the latter, owing
to his cruelty, our country has detested and always will detest.
9. Now, if the attraction of probity is so great that we can love it
not only in those whom we have never seen, but, what is more,
actually in an enemy, we need not be surprised if men's affections
are roused when they fancy that they have seen virtue and
goodness in those with whom a close intimacy is possible. I do not
deny that affection is strengthened by the actual receipt of benefits,
as well as by the perception of a wish to render service, combined
with a closer intercourse. When these are added to the original
impulse of the heart, to which I have alluded, a quite surprising
warmth of feeling springs up. And if any one thinks that this
comes from a sense of weakness, that each may have some one to
help him to his particular need, all I can say is that, when he
maintains it to be born of want and poverty, he allows to friendship
an origin very base, and a pedigree, if I may be allowed the
expression, far from noble. If this had been the case, a man's
inclination to friendship would be exactly in proportion to his low
opinion of his own resources. Whereas the truth is quite the other
way. For when a man's confidence in himself is greatest, when he
is so fortified by virtue and wisdom as to want nothing and to feel
absolutely self-dependent, it is then that he is most conspicuous for
seeking out and keeping up friendships. Did Africanus, for
example, want anything of me? Not the least in the world!
Neither did I of him. In my case it was an admiration of his virtue,
in his an opinion, may be, which he entertained of my character,
that caused our affection. Closer intimacy added to the warmth of
our feelings. But though many great material advantages did
ensue, they were not the source from which our affection
proceeded. For as we are not beneficent and liberal with any view
of extorting gratitude, and do not regard an act of kindness as an
investment, but follow a natural inclination to liberality; so we
look on friendship as worth trying for, not because we are attracted
to it by the expectation of ulterior gain, but in the conviction that
what it has to give us is from first to last included in the feeling
itself.
Far different is the view of those who, like brute beasts, refer
everything to sensual pleasure. And no wonder. Men who have
degraded all their powers of thought to an object so mean and
contemptible can of course raise their eyes to nothing lofty, to
nothing grand and divine. Such persons indeed let us leave out of
the present question. And let us accept the doctrine that the
sensation of love and the warmth of inclination have their origin in
a spontaneous feeling which arises directly the presence of probity
is indicated. When once men have conceived the inclination, they
of course try to attach themselves to the object of it, and move
themselves nearer and nearer to him. Their aim is that they may be
on the same footing and the same level in regard to affection, and
be more inclined to do a good service than to ask a return, and that
there should be this noble rivalry between them. Thus both truths
will be established. We shall get the most important material
advantages from friendship; and its origin from a natural impulse
rather than from a sense of need will be at once more dignified and
more in accordance with fact. For if it were true that its material
advantages cemented friendship, it would be equally true that any
change in them would dissolve it. But nature being incapable of
change, it follows that genuine friendships are eternal.
So much for the origin of friendship. But perhaps you would not
care to hear any more.
_Fannius_. Nay, pray go on; let us have the rest, Laelius. I take on
myself to speak for my friend here as his senior.
_Scaevola_. Quite right! Therefore, pray let us hear.
10. _Laelius_. Well, then, my good friends, listen to some
conversations about friendship which very frequently passed
between Scipio and myself. I must begin by telling you, however,
that be used to say that the most difficult thing in the world was for
a friendship to remain unimpaired to the end of life. So many
things might intervene: conflicting interests; differences of opinion
in politics; frequent changes in character, owing sometimes to
misfortunes, sometimes to advancing years. He used to illustrate
these facts from the analogy of boyhood, since the warmest
affections between boys are often laid aside with the boyish toga;
and even if they did manage to keep them up to adolescence, they
were sometimes broken by a rivalry in courtship, or for some other
advantage to which their mutual claims were not compatible.
Even if the friendship was prolonged beyond that time, yet it
frequently received a rude shock should the two happen to be
competitors for office. For while the most fatal blow to friendship
in the majority of cases was the lust of gold, in the case of the best
men it was a rivalry for office and reputation, by which it had
often happened that the most violent enmity had arisen between
the closest friends.
Again, wide breaches and, for the most part, justifiable ones were
caused by an immoral request being made of friends, to pander to
a man's unholy desires or to assist him in inflicting a wrong. A
refusal, though perfectly right, is attacked by those to whom they
refuse compliance as a violation of the laws of friendship. Now the
people who have no scruples as to the requests they make to their
friends, thereby allow that they are ready to have no scruples as to
what they will do for their friends; and it is the recriminations of
such people which commonly not only quench friendships, but
give rise to lasting enmities. " In fact," he used to say, "these
fatalities overhang friendship in such numbers that it requires not
only wisdom but good luck also to escape them all."
11. With these premises, then, let us first, if you please, examine
the question-how far ought personal feeling to go in friendship?
For instance: suppose Coriolanus to have had friends, ought they to
have joined him in invading his country? Again, in the case of
Vecellinus or Spurius Maelius, ought their friends to have assisted
them in their attempt to establish a tyranny? Take two instances of
either line of conduct. When Tiberius Gracchus attempted his
revolutionary measures he was deserted, as we saw, by Quintus
Tubero and the friends of his own standing. On the other hand, a
friend of your own family, Scaevola, Gains Blossius of Cumae,
took a different course. I was acting as assessor to the consuls
Laenas and Rupilius to try the conspirators, and Blossius pleaded
for my pardon on the ground that his regard for Tiberius Gracchus
had been so high that he looked upon his wishes as law. "Even if
he had wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" said I. "That is a
thing," he replied, "that he never would have wished." "Ah, but if
he had wished it?" said I. "I would have obeyed." The wickedness
of such a speech needs no comment. And in point of fact he was
as good and better than his word for he did not wait for orders in
the audacious proceedings of Tiberius Gracchus, but was the head
and front of them, and was a leader rather than an abettor of his
madness. The result of his infatuation was that he fled to Asia,
terrified by the special commission appointed to try him, joined
the enemies of his country, and paid a penalty to the republic as
heavy as it was deserved. I conclude, then, that the plea of having
acted in the interests of a friend is not a valid excuse for a wrong
action. For, seeing that a belief in a man's virtue is the original
cause of friendship, friendship can hardly remain if virtue he
abandoned. But if we decide it to be right to grant our friends
whatever they wish, and to ask them for whatever we wish, perfect
wisdom must be assumed on both sides if no mischief is to
happen. But we cannot assume this perfect wisdom; for we are
speaking only of such friends as are ordinarily to be met with,
whether we have actually seen them or have been told about
them-men, that is to say, of everyday life. I must quote some
examples of such persons, taking care to select such as approach
nearest to our standard of wisdom. We read, for instance, that
Papus Aemilius was a close friend of Gaius Luscinus. History tells
us that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues in the
censorship. Again, it is on record that Manius Curius and Tiberius
Coruncanius were on the most intimate terms with them and with
each other. Now, we cannot even suspect that any one of these
men ever asked of his friend anything that militated against his
honour or his oath or the interests of the republic. In the case of
such men as these there is no point in saying that one of them
would not have obtained such a request if he had made it; for they
were men of the most scrupulous piety, and the making of such a
request would involve a breach of religious obligation no less than
the granting it. However, it is quite true that Gaius Carbo and
Gaius Cato did follow Tiberius Gracchus; and though his brother
Caius Gracchus did not do so at the time, he is now the most eager
of them all.
12. We may then lay down this rule of friendship-neither ask nor
consent to do what is wrong. For the plea "for friendship's sake" is
a discreditable one, and not to be admitted for a moment. This
rule holds good for all wrong-doing, but more especially in such as
involves disloyalty to the republic. For things have come to such a
point with us, my dear Fannius and Scaevola, that we are bound to
look somewhat far ahead to what is likely to happen to the
republic. The constitution, as known to our ancestors, has already
swerved somewhat from the regular course and the lines marked
out for it. Tiberius Gracchus made an attempt to obtain the power
of a king, or, I might rather say, enjoyed that power for a few
months. Had the Roman people ever heard or seen the like before?
What the friends and connexions that followed him, even after his
death, have succeeded in doing in the case of Publius Scipio I
cannot describe without tears. As for Carbo, thanks to the
punishment recently inflicted on Tiberius Gracchus, we have by
hook or by crook managed to hold out against his attacks. But
what to expect of the tribuneship of Caius Gracchus I do not like
to forecast. One thing leads to another; and once set going, the
downward course proceeds with ever-increasing velocity. There is
the case of the ballot: what a blow was inflicted first by the lex
Gabinia, and two years afterwards by the lex Cassia! I seem
already to see the people estranged from the Senate, and the most
important affairs at the mercy of the multitude. For you may be
sure that more people will learn how to set such things in motion
than how to stop them. What is the point of these remarks? This:
no one ever makes any attempt of this sort without friends to help
him. We must therefore impress upon good men that, should they
become inevitably involved in friendships with men of this kind,
they ought not to consider themselves under any obligation to
stand by friends who are disloyal to the republic. Bad men must
have the fear of punishment before their eyes: a punishment not
less severe for those who follow than for those who lead others to
crime. Who was more famous and powerful in Greece than
Themistocles? At the head of the army in the Persian war he had
freed Greece; he owed his exile to personal envy: but he did not
submit to the wrong done him by his ungrateful country as he
ought to have done. He acted as Coriolanus had acted among us
twenty years before. But no one was found to help them in their
attacks upon their fatherland. Both of them accordingly committed
suicide.
We conclude, then, not only that no such confederation of evilly
disposed men must be allowed to shelter itself under the plea of
friendship, but that, on the contrary, it must be visited with the
severest punishment, lest the idea should prevail that fidelity to a
friend justifies even making war upon one's country. And this is a
case which I am inclined to think, considering how things are
beginning to go, will sooner or later arise. And I care quite as
much what the state of the constitution will be after my death as
what it is now.
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