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by Michael Bakaoukas M.Sc., Ph.D.
University of Piraeus, Greece
The ancient Greek philosophers - The Eleatic School and the Atomists
An Atomist's Black Hole?
The Atomists and members of the Eleatic School argued about whether "that which is not" is really a void. |
Ancient Greek philosophers exhibit an interest in non-being. Parmenides
from Elea (5th c B.C) insisted that what-is-not cannot be and thus cannot be
investigated (Denyer, 24-26). He maintained that attempts to show that
something is not would fail (Diels-Kranz, fr. 28B6.9; 2.7-8). His disciple,
Melissus, asserted that what-is-not is nothing but empty or void. The
Atomists reduced not-being to void. Calling void "not-being" is clearly
provocative, as Parmenides had banned what-is-not and Melissus had used the
notion of void. The Atomists, Leukippus and Democritus did not agree with
the Eleatic claim that void does not exist. The philosophical debate of the
Eleatics and the Atomists over (the existence of) non-being is verified by
Aristotle's De Generatione (324b32-325a12; 325a23-32) according to which the
Eleatics and the Atomists had, if not contradictory, at least opposite
arguments about being and non-being (Furley, 1993; Curd, 1998, 181-2; Pyle,
1997, 41-52).
According to Mourelatos (1970, 88), the eleatic problem of not-being has
nothing to do with meaningfulness of references to nonexistent entities
(chimeras, pegasus, hippogriffs). On Furley's account, "what is not - the
void is still only the negation of whatever properties belong to what is"
(Furley, 1987, 122). That is, void is not non-existent; but while it
exists, it has no positive properties and can be known only indirectly, by
negating the properties of what-is. According to Curd, there are
difficulties in Furley's further account of void. In claiming that void is
to be characterized completely negatively -- as "the negation of whatever
properties belong to what is," Furley saddles the Atomists with exactly what
he says they want to avoid: the claim that what-is-not is neither knowable
nor sayable. For if void is just the negation of everything that is, then we
are immediately faced with the problem of how to know what is nothing at
all. If no properties or nature can be attributed to void, it is difficult to grasp what it is about void that makes it knowable and sayable. Because it lacks a nature, it just is unknowable and unsayable (Curd, 1998, 194). On the contrary, Sedley's account of void treats it as a material element in the Atomist system (Sedley, 1982, 175-179; Curd, 1998, 203-4).
Gorgias
Being thought about doesn't mean that something actually exists. |
In the 5th century B.C. Gorgias claims that "non-being exists." He seems
to say that my claim to non-being is as good as anyone's because non-being
may be thought about (phroneisthai). But, as Gorgias says, being thought
about is no criterion of being. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Malhetnaticos
7.80, mentions the chimera in a paraphrase of Gorgias' On the Non-Being. He
also mentions the Scylla and "chariots running over the sea." The flying
chariots occur in our other source for that work, viz. Ps.-Aristotle's De
Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia [979a-980b in Bekker's edition of Aristotle;
Cassin (1980), 610-643, at p. 641 = Bekker 980a]. According to Newiger
(1973: 144 ff), the only genuine Gorgianic examples of "unrealities that can
be thought" are 'the chariots running over the sea.' 'Scylla,'
'Chimaera' and 'the flying man' are sceptical examples of Sextus who
misunderstood the MXG Gorgianic text and treated it in a sceptical way.
Nevertheless, as Guthrie points out (1975: 706), we should not take this assumption for granted.
Plato
Only through knowledge can we think about that which is. |
In the 4th. century B.C. philosophers, thanks to Plato and Parmenides,
throw all non-being into the waste-bin with the remark that "it shall never
be established that things which are not, are" (Diels-Kranz, Parmenides fr.
7). In the Republic 478b5 Plato says that when one has a belief, one thinks
things, but different things from those that one thinks when one has
knowledge. What one thinks when one has knowledge is "what is." That is to
say, the things which one thinks when one has belief fall under the heading
"what is not." In his argument that "all judgements are true" and in the
relevant argument "from knowing and not-knowing", Plato says that "judging a
falsehood is the same as touching a unicorn; for judging what is false
means judging what is not, which is not judging at all" (Theaetetus 187d1, 187d-189b) [Denyer, 52-53, 110].
Aristotle
People can have opinions about non-being, but that doesn't mean that there is any such thing as non-being. |
Aristotle once stated as a simple matter of fact that people do say "the
non-being is non-being" (Metaphysics 4. 2 1003b10). But contrary to Gorgias, he would not accept an unqualified 'the non-being is.' Thus he said that it does not follow that the non-being is because it is an-object-of-belief (doksaston = 'opinable'), "for it is not the same to be something and to be simpliciter though the similarity of expression makes it seem so" (Sophistici Elenchi 5 167a1-6). He also explained that "there is belief about the non-being not because it is but because it is not" [De Interpretatione 11 21a32-33]. Whichever interpretation is correct, he wanted to say that the very point of saying 'the non-being is opinable' is to make it clear that one will never say 'the non-being is'. The fact that "the non-being is opinable" does not imply that "the non-being is" (De Interpretatione 11 21a25 sqq). Other remarks of Aristotle's include,
"Not-man is not a name [.] Let us call it an infinite name since it holds indifferently of anything, whether being or non-being" (De Interpretatione 2 16a30-33 and 3 16bl2-15). Also, he said that "of that which is not, no one knows what it is, only what the account or the name
signifies when I say 'goat-stag,' but it is impossible to know what a
goat-stag is" [Analytica Posteriora 2.7 92b5-8] (Ebbesen, 1986).
Chimera
Lucretius believed that atoms cannot combine so freely as to create creatures of mixed species. |
The Epicurean Lucretius gives chimeras a physical existence, thinking that
the atomic pictures thrown off by the animals of which chimeras are composed
may get mixed up so as to produce monstrous pictures which men may perceive.
But he will not give us physical existence as sources of those pictures. The
freedom of atoms to combine is not so great, he holds, that beings
consisting of parts belonging to different natural species can arise
[Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.700-717, 4.722-748, 5.878-924]. In case non-beings do not have a physical or perceptual origin, they may have a conceptual existence. That is they are concepts which are formed either directly on the basis of things met with in nature, or through creative work (Ebbesen, 1981a, 1: 191 and 1986).
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