"The Good Life. An Ancient Greek Perspective"
Critical Essays Dealing With the Ancient Greek Philosophy on "The Good Life"
College Year in Athens' Spring 2003 philosophy class, which is being instructed by Dr. Michael Bakaoukas, has been primarily dealing with the examination of ancient Greek thought on the subject of "The Good Life". The class has dealt with the origins of Greek philosophy in the late 6th and early 5th centuries B.C., but has primarily focused on Socrates' moral philosophy and its effects on both Plato and Aristotle, the two main ancient Greek protagonists in the examination of "The Good Life." The purpose of this project will be to examine both the positive views and criticisms of Dr. Bakaoukas' class in dealing with the problem of how to live a good life as was interpreted by Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans. In conclusion, the project explains the reasons why modern society may (or may not) accept the ancient Greek idea of a virtuous good life (MacIntyre, Mortimer Adler). This project was carried out under the supervision of the Director of Studies Dr. Kimon Giokarinis.Michael Bakaoukas, M.Sc., Ph.D.
The Univ. of Piraeus, Greece
International Center for Hellenic and Medidetarranean Studies
College Year in Athens, Greece
Project: "The Good Life. An Ancient Greek Perspective"
Complete Life. "One Swallow Does Not Make the Summer; And So Too a Short Time Does Not Make a Man Happy"
Linguistics confirms that the grammatical alterations of the Greek verbs "ZO" (to live) and "BIOO" (to lead a way of life) have originated from one common root as regards their form and their content. It is the indo-European root "gui-". The common root of the verbs is indicated by their common b form of the past tense "EBION", which particularly means "I lived my life in a specific way, I had a lifestyle." The present ZO generally means "I am alive, I exist". The second past tense "EBION" is an ancient form, as it is usually the case with the second past tense. From it came into existence the later present tense "BIOO" (For the etymology and meaning of the words see J.B. Hofmann, "Etymologisches Worterbuch Des Griechischen," translated in Greek by Anthony Papanikolaou, Athens, 1989 / Big Dictionary of Greek Language, by Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, 1945).
But why do the verbs "ZO" (=I am alive, I exist) and "EBION" (=I lived my life in a specific way) have different content, although they have a common etymological root? The difference between the two forms, the present tense "ZO" and the second past tense "EBION" is a tense but, at the same time, also a genuine semantic alteration of the common root "gui-". In a way the root of the second past tense "EBION" expresses a meaning slightly different from the meaning of the present tense "ZO". The past tense "EBION"and the derivative noun "BIOS" were constructed in order to indicate a new notion about life, a notion more concrete and specific: i.e., the constant purposive and therefore complete, unchangeable way of life, to live a life, as Aristotle says, in a concrete mental way (kata tina noun 1180a17 Nicomachean Ethics) "BIOS is a moral action" (bios praxis estin 1254a7 Eudemian Ethics; 1333a31 Politics).
According to Stephanus, "BIOS" does not mean just life (zoe) but a specific kind of life (bios kai to eidos tes zoes; Stephanus, Allia attulit Sallier. Ad Thomam M. Significationes vocabuli exponit Etymol. M. , p. 198, 13). That is to say, "BIOS" is a lifetime (bios o chronos tes zoes; Stephanus ibid.). It is a rational life and therefore cannot be attributed to animals (Stephanus, De discrimine inter bion et zoen sic praesipit Ammonius, p. 30, et similiter Eranius Philo p. 164 et Thomas M. p. 153) (bios zoes diapherei men epi ton logikon tassetai zoon, toutestin anthropon monon).
This different practical estimation about life was expressed by the second past tense "EBION" and the derivative noun "BIOS". The linguistic selection of the second past tense was the physical one, because whatever has happened in past time has already happened, it can't be changed and therefore has only one form; whereas whatever happens now in present time could be changed and take various forms, until man makes up his mind to select a lifestyle. In other words, a human being who lives now, could possibly retain or change his lifestyle. But whoever lived in past time ("EBION POTE"), it is certain that he chose and followed a specific lifestyle which cannot ever be changed and therefore is observable. Aristotle mentions three rather biologically determined kinds of life: the life of contemplation, the life of politics, and the life of enjoyment (Nicomachean Ethics Book I, v). These observable lifestyles are the only way by which a man can live a social life. They are in force for everybody, because they are the physiological result of the functions of the human psyche. According to Plato, there are more than three types of life, which are chosen by men once and for all (Republic 618a1-3, 617e1-3)
Section A. The Presocratic Philosophy On The Good Life
Solonian Justice: the good and the just life
by Crystal M. Woods, University of Southern California, ClassicsThe Presocratics identify the good life with the just life. Solon envisions justice as a divine power. Vlastos suggests that "Solon is as earnest a moralist as Hesiod," when he juxtaposes Homeric and Hesiodic sanctions of justice such as, "famine and plague, sterility of women, barrenness of land etc..." and Solon's belief that justice will sweep across the entirety of the polis as a plague (Vlastos, 33). The works of Hesiod and Homer recall "the magician-kings who can procure good crops for their people no less than victory in war" (Vlastos, 33). The kings of Hesiod and Homer were imbued with a magical or supernatural, divine power that enabled them to deliver their people from the perils of natural disasters and the calamities of warfare. Similarly, Solon envisions himself as such a divine deliverer. He thinks of justice as a gift the gods give to mortal men, and this too, resembles a Hesiodic concept. Pandora, as described in Hesiod's Theogony and Works and Days, was a bewitching gift sent to mortal men as retribution and justice for Prometheus stealing the fire from Zeus. But rather than presenting the people of the polis with the "traditional repertoire of superstitious terrors, [Solon] makes them look at history, considering cause and effect" (Vlastos, 33). It is here where Solon brings nature and politics together. Vlastos quotes Solon in his treatise on Solonian justice stating, "The sea is stirred by the winds; if someone does not move it, it is the justest of all things" (34). Solon reveals his naturalistic approach to politics as he refutes those, such as Semonides, who hold that the sea is "double natured," suddenly changing from a calm state to its opposite. Rather, Solon posits that any agitation in the water is due to a disturbing cause (Vlastos, 34).
Vlastos goes on to explain the significance of justice to every member of the polis in his treatise by examining the common peace and the common freedom. For Solon, any act of injustice is a threat, unintentional though it may be, to the collective polis. Solon uses somatic metaphors when referring to the polis stating, "any act of injustice, impairing the 'good order,' 'good sense,' and 'soundness' of the common life, is a real cause of civil strife; and the distemper of the body politic... is all-comprehensive in its effects" (Vlastos, 38). Here again, Solon fuses naturalistic and Hippocratic thought into his political treatise. The polis is likened to a body; when one person of the collective body of citizens gets a disease, it can spread rapidly, endangering every member of the polis. This thought echoes the earlier Draconian laws where any member of a polis could slay a man who had posed a threat to another member of the body politic. Because injustice affected everybody, justice was everybody's business. For this reason, in Solon's concept of justice, "the precious right of straightening crooked judgments" was no longer left in the hands of the aristocracy, but rested in the hands of the people (Vlastos, 41). Similarly, Solon held that the bondage of any member of the polis threatened the common freedom of every member of that polis. The polis must therefore protect the freedom of everyone against enslavement.
While Vlastos credits Solon as a great innovator in political justice, he seems disappointed in Solon's traditionalist approach to "acquisitive and distributive justice," or the justice of wealth (Vlastos, 47). Solon adhered to the traditional notion of the justice of wealth put forth by Hesiod. Embedded within this Hesiodic concept of wealth is the idea that the gods give wealth and riches and that they can take away wealth just as easily as they give it. Vlastos remarks on Solon's concept of the justice of wealth when he states, "all that can be enjoyed at any given moment of one's life-is true 'wealth' (aphenos). In this respect, the peasant is the equal of the great landowner. For the latter's surplus cannot be converted into immediate satisfaction" (49). The result of this theory of divine dispensation is that there is only security in the enjoyment of the moment.
While Solon continued to respect the nobles of his time who believed that they had expertise and understanding of supernatural justice, he paved the way for justice to become a matter of 'common' or 'public' truth (Vlastos, 56). In this sense, it became available to all men who could understand justice and teach it to others. Vlastos credits Solon as a great innovator of political justice as he concludes, "the most important of Solon's social and economic reforms was prompted by his concept of political justice. Therein lies his greatness: that, despite the traditionalism of his concept of wealth, he was able to envisage this revolutionary concept of justice based on the solidarity of the polis" (56). Thus as Vlastos makes clear, the naturalization of justice explored in his article, is actually the "socialization" of justice where "justice became the common possession of the polis" and the ruler of peoples' life.
Bibliography (Section A)
J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, Routledge, 1993P. Curd, A Presocratic Reader, Hacket, 1996
K. Freeman, Companion to the Presocratic Philosophers, Blackwell, 1953
A. Long (ed), Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1999
G. Vlastos on the Presocratics, Studies in Gr. Philosophy, Princeton, 1996
A.P.D. Mourelatos, The Presocratics, Princeton, 1993
Michael Bakaoukas, M.Sc., Ph.D.
The Univ. of Piraeus, Greece
International Center For Hellenic And Medidetarranean Studies (www.cyathens.org)
College Year In Athens, Greece
Project: "The Good Life. An Ancient Greek Perspective"
